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Abstract: In this paper, I defend an asymmetrical view concerning the relationship 
between alternative possibilities and moral responsibility, according to which 
alternative possibilities are required for being blameworthy, but not praiseworthy, for 
what one decides or does. I defend the non-necessity of alternatives for 
praiseworthiness through an examination of what I call ‘Luther’ examples. My defence 
of the necessity of alternatives for blameworthiness proceeds instead through an 
analysis of so-called ‘Frankfurt’ examples. In both cases, my arguments rest on the 
contention that, in ascriptions of moral responsibility, the primary question is not 
whether the agent could have done otherwise, but whether she should have done what 
she did, so that the former question only becomes pressing when the answer to the latter 
is negative. Concerning moral responsibility, then, the concept of moral obligation or 
duty is prior to that of alternative possibilities. 
 
Introduction: moral responsibility, alternatives and moral obligation 
The Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) can be stated thus: “A person is morally 
responsible for something she has done only if she was able to do otherwise”. For the 
last forty years or so this principle has been the object of a long and intricate discussion. 
Philosophically speaking, the really important question is not PAP itself, but the core 
intuition behind it, namely, that alternative possibilities (APs) are necessary for moral 
responsibility (MR). In what follows, with “PAP” I shall refer to this core intuition. 
According to some thinkers (Harry Frankfurt 1969, John Fischer 1994, Derk Pereboom 
2001, 2009...) PAP is false. Others contend that it is true (Margery Naylor 1984, Keith 
Wyma 1997, Michael Otsuka 1998...). These are the two main positions about this 
important issue. There are, however, a minority of philosophers (Susan Wolf 1990, 
Dana Nelkin 2008...) who hold an asymmetrical view according to which PAP is true 
for blameworthy actions, but false for praiseworthy ones. In other words, APs are 
 
* With my warmest congratulations to Kevin Mulligan, in acknowledgment of a long 
and fruitful career devoted to philosophical research and teaching. 
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required for negative MR (blameworthiness, reprehensibility), but not for positive MR 
(praiseworthiness, laudability). In this paper, and unlike what I used to hold, I will side 
with this minority position and defend an asymmetrical view of this kind. 
 Susan Wolf’s defence of asymmetry is based on a theoretical approach to MR 
which she labels the “Reason View” according to which, in her own words, “an 
individual is responsible if and only if she is able to form her actions on the basis of her 
values and she is able to form her values on the basis of what is True and Good” (Wolf 
1990, p. 75). In everyday terms, what is necessary and sufficient for MR is to be able to 
distinguish between good and evil and to act on the basis of the former. Now, 
asymmetry follows from this account. If a person behaves rightly and on the basis of 
correct values, this shows that she has the required ability, and so is responsible for 
what she did, no matter whether she could have behaved in a different and less 
admirable manner. Instead, if a person does a wrong thing or does a right thing but on 
the basis of wrong or distorted values, it is not clear whether she has the required ability 
and so whether she is morally responsible. For her to be so, she must be able to act in a 
morally right way on the basis of correct values: she must be able to do otherwise. APs 
are, then, required in order to be blameworthy, but not praiseworthy, for what one does. 
In a recent paper, and following Wolf’s steps, Dana Nelkin defends a similar 
asymmetrical view, which she labels “the rational abilities view”: 
 
I defend a view according to which one is responsible for one’s actions to the 
extent that one has the ability to do the right thing for the right reasons. This view 
is asymmetrical in requiring the ability to do otherwise when one acts badly or for 
bad reasons, but no such ability in cases in which one acts well for good ones” 
(Nelkin 2008, p. 497). 
 
 Though not unrelated to Wolf’s and Nelkin’s, my own defence of an 
asymmetrical view concerning APs rests instead on the concept of moral obligation or 
moral duty. This is a central notion in our everyday conception of MR. More generally, 
the idea of obligation, of what one should or should not do in certain contexts and 
circumstances, is a crucial element in social life and social interaction. We all have 
strong expectations about how others (and ourselves) should behave, and react in 
negative ways when these expectations are frustrated. Social roles and their effective 
playing are central ingredients of human society. Following a relatively old trend in 
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sociology called “symbolic interactionism”, a role can be conceived as a set of mutual 
expectations, which involve certain obligations and, eventually, sanctions. Social 
institutions, in turn, would amount to organized sets of such roles. Moral expectations, 
moral obligations and moral sanctions are a partial aspect of this general social frame; 
they are an integral part of the institution of morality, with ascriptions of MR, of praise 
and blame, as a central aspect of it. So, far from being trivial or unimportant, the 
concept of moral obligation has a principal place in human life. 
Now, my proposal is that we can best understand the place of the demand for 
APs in ascriptions of MR by going through the concept of moral obligation, of what 
people should or should not do or have done. 
In our folk conceptual frame, I contend, MR is related to APs, to freedom to do 
otherwise, through the mediating notion of moral obligation. In assessing MR in 
particular cases, our primary concern is not whether the agent could have done 
otherwise, but whether she should or should not have done what she did. And, as I will 
argue, the question whether the agent could have done otherwise is normally raised only 
when we judge that the agent should not have acted as she did. Instead, when an agent 
has behaved as she should, and for the right reasons, there is nothing that she should 
have done and did not do; this being so, there is usually no point in asking whether she 
could have done what she should not have done. Maybe she could; but even if she could 
not, this does not detract from her praiseworthiness; on the contrary, it may make her 
more praiseworthy than she would have been if she could have done otherwise. As Wolf 
has pointed out, if a person who sees someone else in danger of drowning considers 
seriously the possibility of not jumping in the water owing to, e.g., possible damage to 
her garments, we will probably consider her as less praiseworthy than another who 
simply does not hesitate at all in jumping in the water and does not even consider the 
possibility of doing otherwise. Consider also Luther’s statement, when urged to retract 
his religious views and stop his challenge to the Roman Church: “Here I stand; I can do 
no other”. In my 2006 book, I labelled cases of this kind, in which a person sees so 
clearly what her duty is that it is unthinkable for her to act in a different way, ‘Luther’ 
cases. Cases of this sort have often been used to show the falsity of PAP. They play a 
central role in Dennett’s rejection of this principle (cf. Dennett 1984, p. 133). Dennett 
uses in fact Luther’s example, and he presents as well, as a case of this sort, his 
conviction that he himself would be unable to torture an innocent person for one 
thousand dollars. These cases also play an important role in Harry Frankfurt’s work on 
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MR; he considers some boundaries of a person’s will, which he calls volitional 
necessities, as an integral part of that person’s freedom and autonomy and a central root 
of MR, in opposition to a view that insists almost exclusively on the importance of 
choice among APs. 
As is well known, and unlike Dennett, Frankfurt does not base his rejection of 
PAP on ‘Luther’ cases, but mainly on cases which he himself designed and which, 
because of it, have come to be known as Frankfurt (or Frankfurt-style) cases. To 
anticipate, these are cases in which, putatively, an agent is morally responsible for what 
she has done though, unknown to her, she could not have done otherwise. However, in 
spite of these differences, it is pretty clear that both Dennett and Frankfurt take the 
respective cases to refute PAP concerning MR in general, that is, both as praise- and as 
blameworthiness. This is obvious in Dennett’s case, but it is also pretty clear in 
Frankfurt’s.1 However, in both kinds of cases we can find interesting asymmetries, 
related to moral obligation and the moral quality of the action. 
 
‘Luther’ cases 
Let us attend to ‘Luther’ cases first. As Dennett himself rightly points out, we do not 
find Luther’s avowal, “I can do no other”, as a sign of fragility of his rational faculties, 
but rather as a manifestation of their strength and soundness. And this is so even if, 
owing to the firmness of his convictions and values, he is actually psychologically 
unable to retract his religious and political stance. Concerning our moral assessment, we 
tend to see his avowal and the strength of his commitment as a sign of moral integrity; 
his inability to recant does not undermine his praiseworthiness; it rather increases it. 
Luther acted as he should. There is not a different way of acting that he should have 
gone for. So, even if he actually could have behaved differently, this is either irrelevant 
to his moral praiseworthiness or even damaging to it. Reflection on cases of this kind 
makes us aware that we do not demand APs in order for an agent to be praiseworthy for 
a morally good or admirable action. More common are examples of volitional 
necessities, to use Frankfurt’s terms. Dennett’s inability to torture an innocent person 
for one thousand dollars is an example. But all of us can think of many others. For 
 
1 So, after presenting his putative counterexample to PAP, Frankfurt writes: “It would 
be quite unreasonable to excuse Jones4 for his action, or to withhold the praise to which 
it would normally entitle him, on the basis of the fact that he could not have done 
otherwise” (Frankfurt 1969, p. 7, my emphasis). 
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instance, as I presently am, I simply would be unable, not only to harm my daughters, 
but even to want to harm them. This is simply unthinkable for me. But I do not see why 
this deprives me of the praise I deserve, if I actually do, for caring about them and being 
a decently good father. 
Things are very different, however, when someone acts in a morally wrong and 
objectionable way. Suppose that someone deliberately shows a vile and appalling 
attitude towards a weak and poor person, insulting or even beating her. Now imagine 
that the aggressor utters the same words as Luther did: “I can do no other”. In this case, 
unlike Luther’s, we do not take naturally this avowal as a manifestation of the 
soundness and good functioning of the aggressor’s rational faculties. Rather, we tend to 
assume that something is wrong with her, either in her rationality or in her moral sense, 
or both. And even if she adopts this attitude towards poor people as a result of her 
sincere belief in, say, a strong form of social Darwinism, we still do not tend to see her 
avowal, unlike Luther’s, as a sign of her moral integrity, but rather as a symptom of her 
moral impairment or depravation. In this case, unlike Luther’s, we assume that there is a 
different way of acting that she should have gone for; and we also assume that there is a 
different way of seeing things and of reasoning that she should have adopted. And, 
lacking evidence to the contrary, we assume that, since she should have had different 
beliefs and acted in a different way, she could have done so. Given that she should, and 
could, have done otherwise but did not, she is so far morally blameworthy. We assume, 
then, that APs are relevant, in fact required, for moral blameworthiness as unfulfilled 
moral obligations that the agent was able to fulfil. This is why APs are not required in 
cases of morally praiseworthy acts: here there are no unfulfilled duties, and so no 
alternative ways of behaving, in which the agent satisfies them, are necessary for the 
agent to be blameless or praiseworthy. This is not so with blameworthy actions. So, 
Dennett was wrong in concluding, from the fact that APs are not required for an agent’s 
MR in ‘Luther’, praiseworthiness cases, that PAP is false in all cases. 
We have contended that, in the context of MR ascriptions, when we hold that an 
agent should have acted in a different way than she did, we naturally assume that she 
could have acted in that way. This assumption is an application of an old moral 
principle, namely, that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (OIC). This principle seems to me fully 
reasonable; its plausibility stands out especially in its contrapositive form: if someone is 
unable to A, then she is not morally obliged to A. If someone cannot swim, she is not 
morally obliged to jump in the water in order to save a drowning person. The general 
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moral duty to help someone in danger of dying gets suspended in this particular context 
and for this particular person precisely because she was unable to fulfil it. As I wrote 
some years ago, “Denying it [OIC] means to find it acceptable to burden people with 
moral duties that they cannot discharge, and to hold them morally responsible for 
actions that it is not in their power not to perform. Too much moral weight to carry, it 
seems” (Moya 2006, p. 30). This principle is under some pressure nowadays, and part 
of the reason some people have for rejecting it is precisely their rejection of PAP. But it 
is not clear at all that PAP is false, at least concerning blameworthiness. 
Some people take moral dilemmas to be counterexamples to OIC; the reason is 
that, in them, supposedly, people ought to do something despite being unable to do it. 
But I think this is not right. Consider Sartre’s example of the young Frenchman who 
faces the dilemma between joining the Résistance against the Nazis or taking care of his 
elderly and ill mother. This dilemma does not refute OIC, in my view. The agent has a 
moral duty to join the Résistance; but he can fulfil this duty by joining the Résistance, 
as OIC states. On the other hand, he has a moral duty to take care of his mother; but he 
can fulfil this duty by taking care of his mother, again as OIC says. But I think he has 
not the moral duty to do both, that is, to join the Résistance and to take care of his 
mother simultaneously, precisely because doing that is impossible for him, as looks 
pretty correct and OIC implies. In general, “S ought to A” and “S ought to B” do not 
logically imply “S ought to both A and B”. Rather than seeing the falsity of PAP as a 
reason for rejecting OIC, my advice is to see the truth of OIC as a reason for accepting 
PAP as well. 
Now, in the context of our proposal, we can explain a fact that has intrigued me 
for some years, namely that PAP can be derived from OIC in the case of moral 
blameworthiness, but not of moral praiseworthiness. In the former case, the derivation 
can proceed thus: 
 
A person is morally blameworthy for A-ing only if she ought not to have A-ed 
(Premise P) 
A person ought not to have A-ed only if she was able not to A (OIC) 
Therefore, 
A person is morally blameworthy for A-ing only if she was able not to A (PAP, 
applied to blameworthiness, by transitivity of the implication) 
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The first premise asserts, plausibly enough, that blameworthiness implies a 
violation of a moral duty: the agent did something she should not have done (or omitted 
to do something she should have done). The second premise is OIC. 
Let us try now the derivation of PAP from OIC in the case of praiseworthiness: 
 
A person is morally praiseworthy for A-ing only if she ought to have A-ed 
(Premise P’) 
A person ought to have A-ed only if she was able to A (OIC) 
Therefore, 
A person is morally praiseworthy for A-ing only if she was able to A. 
 
The conclusion in this case may be interesting: it suggests that A-ing by mere 
luck, even if A-ing is morally right, does not make someone praiseworthy. Interesting as 
this may be, it is not what PAP says, however. 
These logical relations are illuminating of internal conceptual connections in the 
field of MR. PAP connects blameworthiness for A-ing (not A-ing) with ability not to A 
(to A); the relation may not be obvious, and it actually has been strongly contested; OIC 
connects moral obligation (not) to A with ability (not) to A; and Premise P provides the 
missing link by connecting blameworthiness for (not) A-ing with moral obligation not 
to A (to A). OIC and Premise P provide the rationale for PAP, by justifying the 
connection it establishes between avoidability and blameworthiness. And they also 
show why PAP cannot be derived from OIC for praiseworthy actions: Premise P is not 
true when we substitute “praiseworthy” for “blameworthy”; it is not true that an agent is 
praiseworthy for A only if she ought not to have A-ed; but this transit from A to not-A, 
which Premise P makes, is essential for PAP to be derived, since it also contains this 
relation. Praiseworthy actions, however, confirm OIC: since the agent has done what 
she should, she clearly was able to do it. 
 
Frankfurt cases 
Let us now attend to Frankfurt cases. They are probably the most important reason why 
many thinkers have been led to think that PAP is false (and to reject OIC as well). A 
typical Frankfurt case might be the following. 
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(ANN) Ann, a student, hates her colleague John and decides to lie to him about 
the date of an oncoming examination. As a result, John misses the exam, with 
some nasty consequences for him. Unbeknownst to Ann, Black, a clever and 
nefarious neurosurgeon who also wants Ann to lie to John, has implanted in her 
brain a device that allows him to monitor Ann’s deliberation. If, on this basis, it is 
clear to Black that Ann is going to decide not to lie, he will press a button that will 
ensure that Ann will decide to lie. However, Black prefers not to intervene unless 
it is necessary. And it is not, for Ann, deliberating fully on her own and for her 
own reasons, decides to lie to John and Black never presses his button. 
 
This example raises a strong intuition to the effect that Ann is fully morally 
blameworthy for lying to John even if, owing to the lurking presence of Black, she 
could not have avoided lying. If so, then PAP is false. A way of resisting this conclusion 
is to hold that some APs remain. Ann could, for example, have shown the sign that 
would have alerted Black of an oncoming decision to tell the truth instead of lying. Or 
she could have postponed her lie. However, not any AP goes in order to sustain PAP 
against Frankfurt cases. To use Fischer’s terms, APs have to be robust in the sense of 
being explanatorily relevant to an agent’s MR. Exactly what robustness or explanatory 
relevance includes is a matter of some controversy, but two aspects seem to be essential 
to it.2 First, in order to be robust, an alternative has to be under the agent’s control. 
Suppose that Ann might have accidentally fainted before lying to John. It looks clearly 
wrong to try to save PAP by adverting to this alternative, even if it is present. Moreover, 
a robust alternative possibility has to be morally significant, in the sense that its 
presence is relevant to the question of whether the agent is morally responsible. So, for 
instance, though it was within Ann’s control to lie to John in a lower or higher tone of 
voice than she actually used, this alternative is not relevant to her blameworthiness for 
lying. Some thinkers, such as Pereboom or Otsuka insist on a third and very strong 
requirement, namely that robust APs have to be such that, had the agent gone for them, 
she would have been fully exempted from blameworthiness. Though quite demanding, 
the requirement has some plausibility.3 In this paper, I will accept this third 
requirement, at least for the sake of the argument. 
 
2 A good and useful characterization can be found in Capes 2010, esp. pp. 69-70. 
3 Pereboom may be right that the intuition behind the requirement of APs for MR is the 
“off the hook” intuition, the assumption that, in order to be blameworthy for some 
 9 
Now, in the context of our proposal, when we explain an agent’s 
blameworthiness by appealing to things she could have done but did not, we are 
presupposing that these are things that she should have done but did not. In our view, 
then, robust, morally significant APs are unfulfilled moral duties. Irrelevant APs, mere 
“flickers”, to use Fischer’s term again, are so because they are not things that the agent 
should have done to be exempted from blame. Our example of Ann’s lying in a lower or 
higher tone of voice is a case at hand. Our account can give, then, a principled 
justification of the requirement of robustness and moral significance for those APs that, 
in Frankfurt cases, can be adverted to in order to defend PAP. 
The intuitions raised by Frankfurt cases may be explained thus: if a rational and 
reasons-responsive agent deliberated, decided and acted fully on her own and for her 
own reasons, without being coerced or compelled, she is morally responsible for what 
she did; it does not matter for her MR whether, unbeknownst to her, there are factors in 
the situation that, without interfering at all in the process of decision and action, make it 
impossible for her to decide and act otherwise. So, why should we accept that someone 
is morally responsible for something she did only if she could have done otherwise? 
The supposedly obvious connection between MR and APs begins to appear as rather 
arbitrary and groundless. 
Things look different, however, if, following our proposal, we introduce the 
concept of moral obligation. Instead of asking, in a situation where MR is at issue, 
whether the agent could have done otherwise, let us start by asking whether the agent 
should have done otherwise. This question has an immediate and direct impact on the 
agent’s MR. If the answer is affirmative, so that the agent did not act as she should, then 
there is prima facie reason to think that she is blameworthy for what she did. Now, 
whereas saying, “She is morally blameworthy for what she did because she could have 
done otherwise” may be in need of further justification, saying, “She is morally 
blameworthy for what she did because she should have done otherwise” is not. In fact, it 
could be used as part of a justification of the former statement, for, if we hold that 
someone should have done other than she did, we are assuming, applying OIC, that she 
was able to do it. 
 
action, one must be able to act in a way that makes one fully blameless. This is 
essentially Otsuka’s Principle of the Avoidability of Blame (cf. Otsuka 1998), a 
principle that he thinks respects the spirit of PAP and is not refuted by Frankfurt cases, 
even if PAP itself might be 
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When it is praiseworthiness that concerns us, things change significantly. 
Saying, “She is morally praiseworthy for what she did because she could have done 
otherwise” is not simply in need of further justification; it looks rather dubious, if not 
false, in view of ‘Luther’ cases. The corresponding “should” statement would be, “She 
is morally praiseworthy for what she did because she did what she should”; and clearly, 
if we say this, we are not assuming that she could have done otherwise (even if she 
actually could). So, unlike blameworthiness, here we cannot use the “should” statement 
to justify the “could” statement. 
How does all this affect Frankfurt cases? Concerning them, a primary question 
would be, “Did the agent do what she should, morally speaking?” If the answer is 
positive, then, ceteris paribus, the agent is morally praiseworthy, and the question, 
“Could she have done otherwise?” does not change this positive assessment. 
Suppose, however, that the answer to that primary question is negative; then 
there seem to be unfulfilled moral duties, things that the agent should have done but did 
not. In such a case, the question whether she could (was able to) have done those things 
becomes crucial. If she could, then she had within her reach robust, even exempting, 
APs, unfulfilled moral duties such that, had she fulfilled them, her blame would have 
decreased or even disappeared. Suppose, however, that the agent could not have done 
the things she should have done. In this case, given OIC, there were no unfulfilled moral 
duties after all, for on this occasion they were suspended for the agent by virtue of her 
impossibility to satisfy them. But then she is not blameworthy, for there was nothing 
that she should have done but did not. 
In either case, then, PAP, applied to blameworthiness, is confirmed. In the first 
case, in which the agent could have fulfilled her duties, she is blameworthy, but she had 
robust, even exempting, APs. In the second case, she had no robust APs, but she was 
not blameworthy, either. 
Frankfurt theorists will object to the preceding considerations on the following 
lines. Assuming the truth of OIC is sort of question begging against them, for they think 
that PAP is false, so that there can be blameworthiness without robust APs; and if OIC, 
together with an additional premise, implies PAP, OIC may be false as well. So, the line 
of argument that has taken us to deny the agent’s blameworthiness is defective. 
According to them, some Frankfurt cases feature agents who could not act so as to get 
exempted from blame but are blameworthy for what they did anyway. 
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At this point, a response might be to insist on the independent plausibility of 
OIC and on the unpalatable consequences of denying it. I think these considerations are 
fully correct. But it is unlikely that this line of argument can convince Frankfurt 
theorists. They will point to the intuitions raised by the relevant Frankfurt cases in order 
to reject both PAP and OIC and to show that denying the latter principle has not the 
unacceptable consequences one could initially expect. We would be caught in a 
dialectical stalemate. 
 
Doing everything one can (DEC) and Frankfurt cases 
My suggestion at this point is to resort to a new principle, drawn from common sense 
wisdom, which has some connections with OIC but is slightly different from it. 
Moreover, it is more intuitively correct than OIC. It is different because, whereas OIC 
relates two notions, namely moral obligation and ability or power, the new principle 
connects three notions, namely moral obligation, ability or power and blameworthiness. 
That it is more intuitive than OIC is something to be left to the reader’s opinion. Let me 
call this principle “DEC” (from “doing everything one can”): 
 
(DEC) If someone does everything she can reasonably do in order to fulfil her 
moral duties, she is not obliged to do more, and so is not morally blameworthy for 
not doing more.4 
 
DEC sounds eminently correct and in full agreement with our sense of justice. It 
seems clearly unfair to demand from an agent to do more when she has done everything 
he can reasonably do in order to comply with morality. Let us now apply this principle 
to some examples, including Frankfurt cases. 
An important feature of Frankfurt cases is that, in them, the agent believes that 
she can do otherwise than she in fact does, though, owing to circumstances fully 
 
4 Note that it does not follow from DEC that anyone who fails to do everything she 
reasonably can do to fulfil her moral duties is ipso facto morally obliged to do more and 
morally blameworthy for not doing it, though such a failure provides a prima facie 
reason for thinking that she is. I believe that this is how it should be, for otherwise DEC 
would often put on our shoulders too heavy moral burdens, given that in many cases we 
can do more, even if we do much. The qualification “reasonably” is important, as well 
as it is attending to the details of particular cases. 
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unknown to her, this belief turns out to be false. A common situation with this feature 
might be the following: 
 
(JOHN) In his way home from work, John meets Robert, a friend of his; Robert 
tells John that he urgently needs to take a taxi to get to an important meeting in 
time and asks him for some money, since he has realized he does not have enough 
cash with him; of course, he goes on, he will return the money as soon as possible. 
John thinks he can comply with Robert’s request quite easily, but he is in rather 
bad temper and not in the mood to be kind; and so he responds to Robert that he is 
sorry but, unfortunately, he has no money with him; he forgot to take his wallet 
this morning while leaving home. Unknown to John, however, he actually has no 
money and no wallet, for a pickpocket stole it half an hour ago while John was 
travelling in the underground train. 
 
Is John blameworthy for not helping Robert with the money he needed? Well, 
not exactly for that. If someone censured him for not helping his friend, he might reply 
that he is not to blame for that, since he could not have helped him. But he is not fully 
blameless, either. Following DEC, he did not do everything he could reasonably have 
done for helping his friend. He should have formed the intention to help and tried to do 
so by reaching for his wallet, if only to discover that it was not in his pocket. Had he 
done so, and given that this is everything he could reasonably have done to help his 
friend, he would have been entirely blameless.5 In this particular context, his attempt to 
help by reaching for his wallet was a fully robust, exempting alternative. 
But let us change a bit the situation. Suppose that no robbery has occurred and 
John has in fact his wallet in his pocket. In these circumstances, reaching for his wallet 
would not have been enough to get rid of blame, for then there would have been 
something more John could have done to fulfil his duty; in the new situation, only 
lending the money to Robert would have made John entirely blameless. So, an act of a 
certain kind (John’s forming the sincere intention to lend the money, manifested in his 
reaching for his wallet) can be an exempting alternative in a certain situation, provided 
 
5 Reasonably: John could, for example, commit a robbery to get the money Robert 
needed; but this would not have been a reasonable thing for him to do. 
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that this is everything the agent could do to fulfil his obligation, but not in another, if 
there is something more he could have done. 
A general lesson to draw might be this: in situations in which MR is at issue, the 
more an agent can do to fulfil her moral duties, the more she must do to get rid of 
blame; conversely, the less she can do, the less she must do to be blameless. So, which 
kinds of actions are fully robust, exempting APs is a contextual matter, and depends 
importantly on the effective extension, in the particular situation an agent is, of her 
power or ability to fulfil her moral obligations. 
Now, Frankfurt cases are precisely examples of situations where an agent’s 
powers are in fact, unbeknownst to her, severely restricted. In them, and unlike John’s 
example, the agent cannot even form an intention or make a decision to act in a certain 
(morally right) way, as happens in Ann’s example. Nevertheless, Frankfurt theorists 
insist that she is blameworthy for what she intends or decides (and does) in spite of 
having no robust alternative intention or decision, not to mention action, within her 
reach; she is blameworthy even if there is no alternative way of acting that would render 
her blameless. If this is correct, then PAP is false not only with respect to praise-, but to 
blameworthiness as well.  
In the light of our preceding line of argument, however, this thesis can be 
challenged. Let me proceed. 
Ann’s example is a classical Frankfurt case. However, as a result of the 
discussion, cases of this sort are currently taken to be defective, though we shall not get 
into the reasons for this view.6 This has led Frankfurt theorists to construct new and 
more complex cases, which supposedly do not show the unwanted features. The 
following is a Frankfurt case of this new brand, which combines features of some recent 
Frankfurt cases:7 
 
(MEAN): Frank is a successful businessman; he occupies a relevant position in an 
important company and has a pretty good financial situation. His brother Neal, 
instead, is in a rather precarious economic condition. One day, Neal visits Frank 
to tell him he has had to incur some debts, not very high indeed, but which can 
 
6 The main problem is the so-called “dilemma defence” of PAP, which has been put 
forward by such thinkers as Kane (1985), Widerker (1995) and Ginet (1996). 
7 Such as Pereboom’s Tax Evasion (Pereboom 2001, 2009) or Widerker’s Brain 
Malfunction-W (Widerker 2006). 
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cause him real trouble if he does not repay them within the next few days. So, 
Neal asks Frank to lend him money to cancel the debts. Frank is a rather mean and 
egoist person, though not pathologically so. Frank’s psychology is such that, in a 
circumstance like this, he only could decide to lend the money to Neal if he took 
seriously moral reasons to do so; but taking seriously these reasons is not 
sufficient for him to make this decision; even if he took these reasons seriously, 
he still might refuse to help Neal for reasons of self-interest, related to his mean 
and egoist character. Unbeknownst to Frank, however, he could not even make 
the decision to help Neal, for his present health condition (which he is ignorant of) 
is such that, if he were to take seriously moral reasons to help Neal, and with them 
the perspective to do actually so, he would suffer a grave heart attack, with the 
result that he would lose consciousness and be taken to the hospital, which would 
make it impossible for him to lend Neal in time the money he badly needs. 
However, no heart attack takes place, for Frank does not take seriously moral 
reasons to help his poor brother and refuses to lend him the money by inventing 
an excuse about his own very precarious financial situation. 
 
According to Frankfurt theorists, Frank is blameworthy for refusing to help 
Neal, though he could not have decided to help him. They concede that Frank had 
within his power taking seriously moral reasons to help Neal; this is an alternative he 
had, something he did not but was able to do. But this alternative, they contend, is not 
robust, in that it is not morally significant. It is true that, had he gone for it, he would 
have been exempted from blame for not helping Neal, because, by suffering a heart 
attack, he would have been unable to help him. But this would have happened by pure 
luck; Frank could not reasonably believe or foresee that, simply by taking seriously 
moral reasons, he would be blameless; remember that, barring Frank’s present (and 
passing) health condition, which had no actual role in his final decision, taking such 
reasons seriously was fully compatible with the decision to let Neal down anyway. 
With examples such as this, Frankfurt theorists seem to occupy a very solid 
position indeed. And we must acknowledge that MEAN (and the original cases that 
inspire it) is a strong example against the necessity of robust APs for blameworthiness. 
If thinking of moral reasons were a robust alternative, it would be very easy to get off 
the moral hook each time we did a morally objectionable thing, such as refusing to help 
a friend or a relative, as Frank did in MEAN. We might excuse ourselves in the 
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following way: “Look, I have decided not to lend you the money you need, but I am not 
blameworthy because I have taken seriously moral reasons for lending you the money”. 
But this is clearly ludicrous. Nobody could think of this as a valid excuse. 
This is undoubtedly correct, but we can give a strong reply to it. Remember our 
initial example of John and Robert. We said that which ways of acting are robust, 
exempting APs is a contextual matter, and depends especially on what an agent can 
effectively do in particular circumstances. This is why if, unknown to John, he had been 
stolen and had no money, a sincere, though unsuccessful, intention to lend Robert the 
cash he needed would have exempted John from blame. But if no robbery occurred and 
John actually had money, the mere intention would not have been enough to exempt 
him from blame; only lending the money would have had this effect. By the same 
reasoning, if we can actually help a friend in trouble, we cannot get rid of blame for not 
helping him merely by taking seriously reasons for helping him. We can then explain 
why, in general, taking seriously moral reasons for acting in a certain morally right way 
is not robust enough to get rid of blame for not deciding and acting that way. But this 
does not mean that taking moral reasons seriously is not a moral duty in a situation like 
the ones we are considering. We are rightly expected to think of our friends’ wellbeing 
and put ourselves in their shoes, as a step towards intending and doing the right thing 
for these right moral reasons. Failure to attend to considerations of this kind is a reason 
for blaming someone as selfish or inconsiderate.8 
Coming back to MEAN, remember that, unknown to Frank, he could not 
actually help Neal; he could not even intend to help him; the only moral duty he was 
actually able to fulfil was precisely to think of Neal’s troubles, put himself into his 
shoes and consider seriously reasons for helping him. So, by parity of reasoning, in the 
same way as, following DEC, John would have been exempted from blame by a sincere 
intention to help Robert if, due to the robbery, he was actually unable to help him, Frank 
would also have been exempted from the blame he now has for refusing to help Neal if 
he had taken seriously moral reasons for helping him, given that this was the only thing 
he could in fact have done, in the circumstances, to fulfil his moral duty to help his 
brother Neal. Frank did not satisfy the antecedent of the DEC principle; he did not do 
 
8 I am aware of Watson’s (2004) important distinction between two aspects of 
responsibility; but getting thoroughly into this would take us too far away from our 
main line of argument. I assume that someone who is inconsiderate and refuses to help a 
friend in trouble is blameworthy in both aspects that Watson distinguishes. 
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everything he could reasonably have done in order to fulfil his moral duties; he had an 
unfulfilled moral obligation which he could have fulfilled and did not; there is, then, 
reason to think that he is morally blameworthy for his refusal to help Neal. In the 
circumstances of the case, the tiny, though morally significant, mental act of taking 
moral reasons seriously was a robust, in fact exempting, alternative possibility that 
Frank had within his power. Therefore, MEAN and similar, highly sophisticated 
Frankfurt cases do not show that, in the absence of any robust, morally significant, 
exempting alternative, an agent can be blameworthy for what she did. Frank was 
blameworthy but he had such an alternative. MEAN has not shown that 
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